We provide a simple proof of the completeness of arbitrary public announcement logic AP AL. The proof is an improvement over the proof found in [2] .
Introduction
In [2] Arbitrary Public Announcement Logic (AP AL) is presented. This is an extension of the wellknown public announcement logic [3] with quantification over announcements. The logic is axiomatized, but the completeness proof may be considered rather complex. The completeness is shown by employing an infinitary axiomatization, that is then shown to be equivalent (it produces the same set of theorems) to a finitary axiomatization. The completeness proof in [2] contained an error in the Truth Lemma. The lemma is as follows: Let ϕ be a formula in L apal . Then for all maximal consistent theories x and for all finite sequences ψ = ψ 1 , . . . , ψ k of formulas in L apal such that ψ 1 ∈ x, . . .,
The proof is by induction on ϕ. The problem is that in expression M c | ψ, x |= ϕ, the restriction M c | ψ of the canonical model M c cannot be assumed to exist: although we have assumed that ψ 1 ∈ x, . . ., and that [ψ 1 ] . . . [ψ k−1 ]ψ k ∈ x, we did not assume that M c , x |= ψ 1 , . . . , and that M c , x |= [ψ 1 ] . . . [ψ k−1 ]ψ k . The latter would be needed to guarantee that existence. But the induction was only on ϕ and not on ψ 1 , . . . , and [ψ 1 ] . . . [ψ k−1 ]ψ k as well. This error has been corrected in [1] , by an expanding the complexity measure used in the Truth Lemma to include the formulas in the sequence
Another source of confusion in [2] , although there was no error involved, concerned the employment of maximal consistent theories (instead of maximal consistent sets, a more common term in modal logic), and a number of properties shown for maximal consistent theories. While repairing the completeness proof, and while also considering additional properties of the canonical model, we found another completeness proof, that the reader may consider more direct and more elegant than the one in [2, 1] . This is presented in this work, including some further results for the canonical model.
We define the other Boolean constructs as usual. The formulasK a ϕ, ϕ ψ and ✸ϕ are obtained as abbreviations:K a ϕ for ¬K a ¬ϕ, ϕ ψ for ¬[ϕ]¬ψ and ✸ϕ for ¬✷¬ϕ. We adopt the standard rules for omission of the parentheses. Given a formula ϕ, the set of all subformulas of ϕ is denoted by Sub(ϕ) (an elementary inductive definition is omitted). We will say that a formula ϕ is ✷-free iff Sub(ϕ) ∪ {ϕ} contains no formula of the form ✷ψ. A formula ϕ is said to be [·]-free iff Sub(ϕ) ∪ {ϕ} contains no formula of the form [ψ]χ. We will say that a formula ϕ is epistemic iff ϕ is both ✷-free and [·]-free. The set L pal is the set of all ✷-free formulas. The set L el is the set of all epistemic formulas.
Of crucial importance in the completeness proof is a proper complexity measure on formulas. The one we need is based on a partial order < Size providing a weighted count of the number of symbols, and on a partial order < d✷ counting the number of stacked ✷ operators in a formula.
Definition 2 (Size)
The size of a formula ϕ, in symbols Size(ϕ), is the non-negative integer inductively defined as follows:
The ✷-depth of a formula ϕ, in symbols d ✷ (ϕ), is the non-negative integer inductively defined as follows:
We define the binary relations < Size , < d✷ , and < Size d✷ between formulas in the following way:
•
The next two lemmas combine a number of results on these binary relations. Their proofs are obvious and have been omitted.
Lemma 1 Let ϕ, ψ be formulas.
• < Size is a well-founded strict partial order between formulas.
• < d✷ is a well-founded strict partial order between formulas.
• < Size d✷ is a well-founded strict partial order between formulas.
• If ϕ < Sub ψ then ϕ < Size ψ.
Lemma 2 Let ϕ, ψ, χ be formulas and a ∈ Agt.
The relation < Size has been tailored in order to ensure exactly the properties of Lemma 2. Without the curious factor 3 in Size([ϕ]ψ) = Size(ϕ) + 3 · Size(ψ) these properties would not hold. Given the previous lemmas, we can now list all the cases later used in the Truth Lemma.
Corollary 1
In cases ( * ) and ( * * ), ϕ is epistemic. •
Semantics
We introduce the structures and give a semantics for the logical language on these structures. The material in this section (as also the logical language in the previous section, and the axiomatization in the next section) is as in [2] . 
Axiomatization
An axiomatic system consists of a collection of axioms and a collection of inference rules. Let us consider the following axiomatic system: Definition 6 (Axiomatization AP AL) (A0) all instantiations of propositional tautologies,
({ξ([ψ]ϕ): ψ is epistemic}, ξ(✷ϕ)).

Let AP AL be the least subset of L apal containing (A0)-(A13) and closed under (R0)-(R4). An element of AP AL is called a theorem.
In [2] other (finitary) axiomatizations are also given, that are then shown to be equivalent to AP AL (they define the same set of theorems as AP AL). For the completeness proof, we have chosen the most convenient form, with the infinitary rule (R4). Some of the axioms and rules in the axiomatization AP AL are derivable from the other axioms and rules, again, see [2] for details. It concerns the following rules and axioms (where ⊥ should be seen as the abbreviation of p ∧ ¬p):
(R3) ({ϕ}, ✷ϕ).
Canonical model Definition 7 (Theory) A set x of formulas is called a theory iff it satisfies the following conditions:
• x contains AP AL,
• x is closed under (R0) and (R4).
A theory x is said to be consistent iff ⊥ ∈ x. A set x of formulas is maximal iff for all formulas ϕ, ϕ ∈ x or ¬ϕ ∈ x.
Obviously, the smallest theory is AP AL whereas the largest theory is L apal . The only inconsistent theory is L apal . The reader may easily verify that a theory x is consistent iff for all formulas ϕ, ϕ ∈ x or ¬ϕ ∈ x. Moreover, for all maximal consistent theories x,
• ¬ϕ ∈ x iff ϕ ∈ x,
Theories are closed under (R0) and (R4) but not under the derivation rules (R1), (R2), and (R3) for a specific reason. Obviously, by definition, all derivation rules preserve theorems. Semantically, we could say that they all preserve validities. Now, unlike (R1), (R2), and (R3), the derivation rules (R0) and (R4) also preserve truths. That is the reason! In the setting of our axiomatization based on the infinitary rule (R4), we will say that a set x of formulas is consistent iff there exists a consistent theory y such that x ⊆ y. Obviously, maximal consistent theories are maximal consistent sets of formulas. Under the given definition of consistency for sets of formulas, maximal consistent sets of formulas are also maximal consistent theories.
Definition 8
For all formulas ϕ and for all a ∈ Agt, let
The proofs of the following lemmas can be found in [2] (Lemmas 4.11 and 4.12).
Lemma 3 Let ϕ be a formula and a ∈ Agt. For all theories x,
• x + ϕ is a theory containing x and ϕ,
x is a theory,
Lemma 4 Let ϕ be a formula. For all theories x, x + ϕ is consistent iff ¬ϕ ∈ x.
Lemma 5 Each consistent theory can be extended to a maximal consistent theory.
The proof of the next lemma uses axioms (A4)-(A6).
Lemma 6 Let a ∈ Agt. For all maximal consistent theories x, y, z,
Next lemma is usually called "Diamond Lemma". Its proof is very classical and uses Lemmas 3, 4 and 5.
Lemma 7 Let ϕ be a formula and a ∈ Agt. For all theories x, if K a ϕ ∈ x, then there exists a maximal consistent theory y such that K a x ⊆ y and ϕ ∈ y.
The next three lemmas were not found in [2] .
Lemma 8 Let ϕ be a formula. For all maximal consistent theories x, if ϕ ∈ x, then [ϕ]x is a maximal consistent theory.
Lemma 9 Let ϕ, ψ be formulas. For all maximal consistent theories x, ϕ ψ ∈ x iff ϕ ∈ x and ψ ∈ [ϕ]x.
Lemma 10 Let ϕ be a formula and a ∈ Agt. For all theories
Proof Suppose ϕ ∈ x. For all formulas ψ, the reader may easily verify that the following conditions are equivalent:
• W c is the set of all maximal consistent theories;
• R c is the function assigning to each agent a the binary relation R c a on W c defined as
• V c is the function assigning to each atom p the subset V c (p) of W c defined as
It will be clear that the canonical model is a model according to Definition 4. By Lemma 5, W c is a non-empty set, and by Lemma 6 the binary relation R c (a) is an equivalence relation on W c for each agent a.
Completeness
The main result of this Section is the proof of AP AL's Truth Lemma (Lemma 12). This proof is different from and simpler than the proof presented in [2] .
Definition 10 Let ϕ be a formula. Condition P (ϕ) is defined as follows.
For all maximal consistent theories x, ϕ ∈ x iff x ∈ ϕ M c .
Condition H(ϕ) is defined as follows.
For all formulas ψ, if ψ < Size d✷ ϕ, then P (ψ).
Our new proof of AP AL's Truth Lemma is done by using an < Size d✷ -induction on formulas. More precisely, we will demonstrate that
Conclusion
We have provided an alternative, simpler, completeness proof for the logic AP AL. The proof is considered simpler, because in the crucial Truth Lemma we do not need to take finite sequences of announcements along. Instead, it can proceed by < Size d✷ -induction on formulas. We consider this result useful, as the completeness proofs of various other logics employing arbitrary announcements or other forms of quantifiying over announcements may thus also be simplified, and as it may encourage the developments of novel logics with quantification over announcements. We acknowledge useful discussions on the completeness of AP AL with Jie Fan, Wiebe van der Hoek, and Barteld Kooi.
